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Abstract
When each of the members of a collective displays a demand behavior that is consistent with
a homogeneous of degree one in income demand, it is well known that some properties carry
over to the aggregate representative consumer. We investigate those issues when the
components of the society are allowed to behave in agreement with less restrictive demand
patterns, namely superior demand functions.
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Many authors have studied conditions ensuring that aggregate demand behavior has prop-
erties that are desirable for individual demand. This enables us to attach the aggregate be-
havior to a ﬁctitious representative consumer. A common assumption has inveterately been
that the distribution of income be ﬁxed. Eisenberg (1961) and Chipman (1974) showed that
if the individual demands are representable by homogeneous and concave utilities and satisfy
the budget equality, then so is the aggregate. Shafer (1977) adopted a revealed preference
position, arguing that to prove properties of aggregate demand is a problem of algebraic
nature. Thus he stated that if the individual demand functions are homogeneous of degree
one in income and satisfy the budget equality, and each of them satisﬁes the Strong Axiom of
Revealed Preference (SARP), then their aggregate demand satisﬁes a strengthened version
of the Strong Axiom.
We intend to investigate to which extent Shafer’s algebraic technique can yield new con-
ditions ensuring that aggregate demand can be generated by utilities, in the sense of e.g.,
Chipman (1974). We consider the larger class of superior demand functions when the dis-
tribution of income remains ﬁxed. In Section 2 we make our setting explicit and recall in
passing the solution available for the individual homogeneous case, which permits to infer
our motivating aggregation result. Along Section 3 we explore the main issue. Subsection
3.1 provides examples that show that extending classical results by Shafer is feasible. In Sub-
section 3.2 we prove that the Strong Axiom is not aggregable in the whole class of superior
demand functions, even when rather restrictive requirements are imposed on the individual
demand functions and the distribution of income remains ﬁxed. All these results help to
interpret correctly the meaning of a widely spread but discouraging comment by Shafer on
the little chances of aggregating the Strong Axiom except for the tight realm of homogeneous
demand functions. We gather our conclusions in Section 4.
2. Integrability and the aggregation of homogeneous demand
Let h1,...,hm : P × M −→ X be demand functions associated with a population of
m consumers and consumption set X ⊆ Rn
+. We assume hi(αp,αw) = αhi(p,w) for each
(p,w) ∈ P ×M and α > 0. Unless otherwise stated, we also assume P ×M = Rn
++ ×R++.
The demand function hi is representable if there is a function ui : X −→ R such that
hi(p,w) = {x ∈ B(p,w) : ui(x) > ui(y) for all y ∈ B(p,w)}, for any (p,w) ∈ P × M, where
B(p,w) = {x ∈ X : px 6 w}. We also write that ui generates hi instead.
We now consider the group of consumers as a social aggregate, and denote their demand
function by H(p,w). Should the collective have w at their disposal, once that income has
been splitted among them (w = w1 + .... + wm with wi > 0 for all i) then H(p,w) =
h1(p,w1) + ... + hm(p,wm). Under ﬁxed distribution of income, it is assumed that there are
preﬁxed δ1,...,δm strictly positive and summing up to 1 in such way that wi = δiw for each
i. Now the question arises as to when we can ensure the integrability of H(p,w), that is,
when there is a suﬃciently nice function u : X −→ R such that H(p,w) = {x ∈ B(p,w) :
u(x) > u(y) for all y ∈ B(p,w)}, for any (p,w) ∈ P × M.
1Take any demand function h. If y 6= x and there is (p,w) ∈ P ×M such that y ∈ B(p,w)
and x ∈ h(p,w), then we say that x is revealed preferred to y , denoted xS y . Also, h
satisﬁes the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) if S is asymmetric, and h satisﬁes
the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) if S is acyclic1.
In Fuchs-Seliger (1981) a list of axioms is provided in order to ensure that a demand
function is generated by S∗ (cf. Theorem 1 below).
DI. h : Rn
++ × R++ → Rn
++ is a continuous demand function.
DII. The range of h is Rn
++.
DIII. h satisﬁes the budget equality p · h(p,w) = w, ∀(p,w) ∈ R
n+1
++ .
DIV. Lipschitz condition with respect to w: for any p0,p1 ∈ Rn
++ there is K ∈ R++ such
that for all w,w0 > 0 and for all t ∈ [0,1]: kh(pt,w) − h(pt,w0)k 6 K|w − w0|, where
pt = tp0 + (1 − t)p1.
DV. S is acyclic (i.e., xS∗y ⇒ ¬(ySx), for all x,y in the range of h).
DVI. h is homogeneous of degree one in income.
The system of axioms DI – DV is a modiﬁcation of a former one due to Uzawa (1971). As
he pointed out, under these conditions an upper semicontinuous utility functions generating
the given demand function exists. In the current axiomatics, DIII is redundant as stems
from (8) in Alcantud et al. (2006), and so is DIV too. We keep mentioning Walras’ law in
the statements for the sake of the tradition.
Deﬁne the binary relation S∗ by means of the expression: xS∗y if and only if yS∗x is
false. We say that it is monotone if x > y plus x 6= y entail xS∗y, ∀x,y ∈ X. It is
homothetic if xS∗y yields λxS∗λy,∀x,y ∈ X,∀λ > 0. Then (cf. Fuchs-Seliger, 1981):
THEOREM 1 Under hypotheses DI, DII, DIII, DV and DVI, S∗ is transitive, complete,
strictly convex, monotone, homothetic and continuous. Therefore, there exists a utility func-
tion which is homogeneous of degree one, continuous, strictly quasi-concave and monotone,
representing S∗ and generating the given demand function.
The next immediate though nonetheless original consequence may be seen as an axioma-
tization leading to the setting that is presumed in Chipman (1974), Theorem 4, but without
any reference to diﬀerentiability restrictions (as in Shafer and Sonnenschein, 1982, Theorem
3).
COROLLARY 1 If each of h1, ... , hm satisﬁes DI, DII, DIII, DV and DVI and we
have ﬁxed distribution of income, then their aggregate demand function H : P × M −→ Rn
+
derives from maximization of a continuous, monotone, homogeneous of degree 1, and strictly
quasi-concave utility function u : Rn
++ −→ R+, when the range of H is Rn
++.
1There are alternative statements for the strong axiom, e.g., that the transitive hull S∗ of S be asymmetric
(see Uzawa, 1971, Fuchs-Seliger, 1980) or irreﬂexive (Hurwicz and Richter, 1971).
23. Integrability and aggregation properties without homogeneity of the demand
One can infer Corollary 1 because the aggregate demand satisﬁes the same list of axioms
and thus Theorem 1 applies. The only relevant issue in its proof is that an appeal to Theorem
2 in Shafer (1977) is needed in order to aggregate the Strong Axiom. The fundamental
mechanisms involved in the suﬃciently “nice” diﬀerentiable instance can be now explained
in view of subsequent achievements as follows. Suppose that we consider a list h1,...,hm
of individual demand functions of C1 satisfying the budget equality and being deﬁned for
each positive price-income pair. Now, assume that they satisfy the Strong Axiom and are
homogeneous of degree 1 in income (for example, because each hi derives from a homothetic
preference as in Chipman, 1974). Then, the Slutsky matrix of each demand function is
symmetric and negative semideﬁnite (everywhere on its domain), by Uzawa (1971). Following
the proof of Chipman (1974), Theorem 4, their aggregate demand by any ﬁxed distribution
of income has symmetric and negative semideﬁnite Slutsky matrix too. Therefore, such
aggregate demand function can be derived from a homogeneous of degree 1 utility function
(Chipman, 1974, Theorem 2, also Richter, 1979, Theorems 10 and 12).
In the literature on the topic this argument is presumed to suppose a bound as to pos-
sible extensions of our initial result, on the basis of Shafer’s (1977) argument (pp. 1177-8).
Quoting from p. 1178, “there is little hope of obtaining SARP (...) in the aggregate without
the assumption of homogeneity of degree -1 in p” (or homogeneity of degree 1 in income,
which is equivalent under DIII). Because aggregate demand functions generated by utilities
forcefully satisfy the Strong Axiom, such restriction must apply to them.
However, Shafer’s argument focuses on certain diﬀerentiable demand functions. So, the
question remains: Can we get aggregate demand functions other than homogeneous of degree
1 in income that are generated by utilities? We proceed to show that the answer is positive
in the next Subsection. In Subsection 3.2 we wonder if this can be achieved when we consider
superior demand functions. The answer to that question is negative.
3.1 Some clarifying examples
We describe some classes of situations that illustrate the feasibility of obtaining SARP
in the aggregate without any homogeneity assumption on the demand functions involved.
Example 1 below puts forward a whole collection of such situations. As a straightforward ex-
ample, we pick the demand function h0 associated with the utility function u0(x1,...,xn) =
(x1 + a)x2 ···xn (where a > 0 is ﬁxed, and x ∈ Rn
+). Then h0 satisﬁes the Strong Axiom
DV since it is mandatory for representable demand functions. Nonetheless, h0 is not ho-
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(n−1)pn) for w 6 (n − 1)ap1.
Deviations from Shafer’s prediction increase as long as we move away from the domain
restriction in DI.
3In the ﬁrst place, if we are not bounded by DI then we can get a subclass of quasi-
homothetic and diﬀerentiable demand functions that preserve SARP under aggregation by
a ﬁxed distribution of income. We use the term quasi-homothetic for a demand function




++ → Rn. Observing that the demand function
˜ h(p,w) =
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w − (n − 1)a1p1 + a2p2 + .... + anpn
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w + a1p1 − (n − 1)a2p2 + .... + anpn
np2
, ...,




for (p,w) ∈ P × M ⊆ Rn
++ × R+ adequate (we need to request w − (n − 1)a1p1 + a2p2 +
.... + anpn > 0, ....,w + a1p1 + a2p2 + .... − (n − 1)anpn > 0), one can see that it derives
from the utility assignment ˜ u(x1,...,xn) = (x1 + a1)···(xn + an) for xj > −aj, xj > 0 for
any j 6 n. In the following example we will assume that every individual possesses such a
demand function.
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for (p,w) ∈ P i × M adequate, then they satisfy SARP by the comment above. We aggregate
these demand functions under ﬁxed distribution of income (δ1,...,δm).
Let f P i = {(p,δiw) : (p,w) ∈ P i×M}, and Aj =
Pm
i=1 ai
j for each j. Because the aggregate
of h1,...,hm by a ﬁxed distribution of income can be deﬁned on
T
i=1,...,m f P i by
H(p,w) =

w − (n − 1)A1p1 + A2p2 + .... + Anpn
np1
, ...,
w + A1p1 + A2p2 + .... − (n − 1)Anpn
npn

it satisﬁes SARP due to the comment preceding Example 1. Hence, the individual demand
functions and their aggregate satisfy the Strong Axiom although they are not homogeneous
of degree one in income.
In the second place, the next example shows that, within the class of demand function
that satisfy only w > w0 ⇒ h(p,w) > h(p,w0) and h(p,w) 6= h(p,w0), the Strong Axiom can
be aggregated when DI is not mandatory2.
EXAMPLE 2 Consider two individuals with the same utility function ui : R3
+ → R,
ui(x) = x1x2 + x3 for i = 1,2.



















2p2,0) for wi 6
2p1p2
p3 .
2This is in accordance with a more general framework, as we can ﬁnd in e.g., Sonnenschein (1971), where
the domain of h may be a special subset of P × M and the range of h may be a subset of Rn.
4Inquiring the Engel curve {x|x = h(¯ p,wi),∀wi ∈ R+}, for any ﬁxed ¯ p ∈ R3
++, we realize
that it is increasing in w, and it is kinked at wi =
2¯ p1¯ p2
p3 . Thus, the partial derivatives of
h(¯ p,wi) with respect to wi do not exist at that point.
Assume the ﬁxed distribution of income (δ,1 − δ), where δ 6 1
2 without loss of generality.
Let D = {(p,w) : p ∈ R3
++,w >
2p1p2
δp3 }, It is simple to check that the aggregate demand







3 ). Therefore, as one can realize,
such H(p,w) is generated by the utility function u(x) = x1x2 + 2x3.
3.2 Limits of aggregation in case of superior demand functions
We now turn to a class wider than homogeneous of degree one demand functions, namely
superior demand functions. For bundles x,y ∈ Rn, x > y means xi > yi ∀i = 1,...,n. Then,
superiority of h amounts to:
DVII. w > w0 ⇒ h(p,w) > h(p,w0) , ∀w,w0 > 0, ∀p ∈ Rn
++.
Under mild diﬀerentiablity assumptions, demand functions h satisfying DVII (and the
budget equivalence) can be characterized by: for each j = 1,...,n,
∂hj
∂w (p,w) > 0 for all
(p,w). DIII prevents a demand function satisfying this latter requirement –and, thus, having
non-decreasing demand of good j for ﬁxed prices p– from displaying w > w0 with h(p,w) =
h(p,w0).
By a proof which is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1 one gets:
THEOREM 2 (Fuchs-Seliger, 2003) Let H(p,w) satisfy DI – DIII, DV and DVII.
Then, ¯ S∗
H is transitive, complete, monotone, strictly convex and continuous, and therefore it
can be represented by a continuous, strictly quasiconcave utility function.
In Theorem 2 we consider a class of possibly “kinked” demand functions for which SARP
holds without being necessarily homogeneous in income (for instance, the demand function
h0 in Subsection 3.1 satisﬁes DI–DV according to Uzawa, 1971, and also DVII, for w > (n−
1)ap1, but it is not homogeneous in income). For each H under the hypotheses of Theorem
2, any choice of k = 2,3,.... gives place to a new demand function, namely hk(p,w) =
1
kH(p,kw), that also satisﬁes these properties though it is homogeneous in income if and
only if so is H (and, in this event, H = hk). Moreover, H is the aggregation of k individual
demand functions of type hk under proportional distribution of income (δ1 = ... = δk = 1
k)
since H(p,w) = khk(p, 1
kw).
Is SARP aggregable for superior demand functions? If yes, that would permit to use the
corresponding result at individual level –i.e., Theorem 2– exactly as Shafer did, in order
to get an analogue to Corollary 1 for superior aggregate demand functions. Unfortunately,
the answer to that question is negative, even when some heavy additional restricions are
imposed: the next example 3 proves that the analogue to Corollary 1 for superior demand
functions does not hold true:
3Example 3 adds information to the comment in Example 5 of Shafer and Sonnenschein (1982) with
respect to the aggregability properties of a very speciﬁc functional form.
5EXAMPLE 3 Let us deﬁne h1,h2 : R3
++ × R++ → R2
++ continuous demand functions
as follows. The demand h1(p,w) is derived from the utility function u1(x,y,z) = log(x) +
log(y) +
√
z. Some of its properties are analyzed e.g., in Shafer (1977), p. 1178 (see also
Shafer and Sonnenschein, 1982, Example 5). Thus we are aware that DIII and DV are
satisﬁed. Letting ϕ(t) =
 √












































thus it is easy to check that DII and DVII (therefore DIV) hold. Clearly, DVI does not.
The demand h2(p,w) is derived from the utility function u2(x,y,z) = log(x)+log(z)+
√
y.











































However, consider the aggregate demand by the distribution of income (1
2, 1
2), namely,



















































Its Slutsky matrix (SH
ij (p,w))i,j is not symmetric for each price-income pair. For instance,





































































140 ≈ −0.001798197876. This means that H can not satisfy the
Strong Axiom DV (Richter, 1979, Theorems 10 and 12; Jerison, 1984, Lemma 1).
64. Conclusions
Despite a commonly held belief, the question of ﬁnding a class of demand functions
other than homogeneous of degree one in income for which the Strong Axiom aggregates is
meaningful and remains open. We have provided arguments to show that the preliminary
restriction posed by Shafer’s comment is less stringent than apparent. Particular examples
have illustrated that possibility; the speciﬁc form of the domain restriction was crucial.
Theorem 2 hinted that superior demand functions might provide a very general answer
to that question. However, Example 3 proved that SARP is not aggregable in the class of
superior demand functions even when many other relevant restrictions are imposed.
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